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FEDERAL TAXATION
MARTIN

S.

ALLEN*

During the past term the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit decided twenty-six cases relating to federal taxes. Twentyone of these were on appeal from the district courts and five from the
Tax Court. Thirteen of the cases involved appeals from criminal convictions, ten involved civil income tax controversies, and two involved the
federal estate tax. One case related to the enforcement of the federal excise
tax on diesel fuel. Of course, many of the decisions are of limited
significance since they concern such things as the sufficiency of evidence in
areas where the law is settled. This article discusses only those cases which
are of more general interest to the tax bar.
INCOME TAX

Sale of PatentRights Limited to A GeographicArea: Ordinary
Income or Capital Gain
In Klein v. Commissioner' the Seventh Circuit, reversing the Tax
Court, lined up with the Sixth 2 and Ninth Circuits3 in sustaining the validity
4
of regulations under section 1235 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Briefly, section 1235 accords long-term capital gain treatment to gain
recognized on a transfer by certain individuals of "all substantial rights to a
patent." 5 The section applies irrespective of whether the amount of the
consideration is contingent upon the use or productivity of the patent or
whether it is paid in a lump sum or over the life of the patent. The holding
period is also immaterial for long-term capital gain treatment to apply., In
order to qualify for the special treatment accorded by section 1235, the
transferor must be a "holder" of the patent rights. 7 A "holder" is defined as
either an individual whose efforts created the patented invention or an
individual who purchased his interest in the patent before the invention was
J.D., Columbia University; member of the Illinois Bar.
1. 507 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'g 61 T.C. 332 (1973), cert. denied, 421

*

U.S. 991 (1975).

2. Fawick v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1971), rev'g 52 T.C. 104
(1969).

3. Mros v. Commissioner, 493 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'g 30 T.C.M. 519
(1971).
4. Hereinafter referred to in the text as the Code.
5. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1235; Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-1 (1965).

6. id.
7. Id.
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reduced to practice, that is before it was tested and operated successfully
under operating conditions.8
Section 1235 was first enacted with the 1954 Code. Prior to its
enactment, there was no special provision applicable to transfers of patent
rights. Whether a transfer resulted in a capital gain depended first upon
whether sufficient rights were transferred to constitute a sale of a capital
asset under section 117 of the 1939 Code (the predecessor of section 1221
of the 1954 Code), as distinguished from the transfer of a lesser interest such
as a license, and second upon whether the taxpayer held the asset primarily
for sale to customers, that is, whether he was a professional inventor as
opposed to an amateur. 9 Such considerations continue to apply to transfers
of patent rights which do not come within section 1235, for example, because
the transferor is not a "holder" as defined in that section. 10
In defining the term "all substantial rights to a patent," the regulations
state that the term does not include a grant of rights which is limited
"geographically within the country of issuance."" It was the validity of this
regulation which was at issue before the Seventh Circuit in Klein v.
Commissioner.1 2 The taxpayer held a patent covering a process for the
conversion of organic waste into fertilizer. In 1960 he entered into an
agreement under which he assigned his patent rights as to certain eastern
states to a Pennsylvania company, retaining his rights as to all other areas. In
his tax returns for 1966 through 1968, he treated the resulting royalties as
long-term capital gain. Based upon the regulation, the Service treated the
royalties as ordinary income.
3
The Tax Court, relying on its earlier decision in Vincent B. Rogers,
held that "all substantial rights" were transferred despite the geographical
limitation. 1 4 In Rogers the Tax Court had held that the regulation was
invalid since, in the Tax Court's view, the restriction in the regulation on
geographically limited tranfers is contrary to the intent of Congress in
enacting section 1235. The court stated:
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1235(b); Treas. Reg. H9 1.1235-2(d), 1.1235-2(c)
(1965). See also Flanders v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 935 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
9. See, e.g., Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258 (1946).
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-1(b) (1965).

11. Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(b)(1)(i) (1965). The regulations also provide that
grants which are limited to a period less than the remaining life of the patent, cover less
than all fields or uses covered by the patent, or cover less than all of the claims or
inventions covered by the patent do not constitute a grant of "all substantial rights."
Treas. Reg. 99 1.1235-2(b)(1)(ii)-(iv) (1965). Fawick v. Commissioner, 436 F.2d 655
(6th Cir. 1971), rev'g 52 T.C. 104 (1969), and Mros v. Commissioner, 493 F.2d 813
(9th Cir. 1974), rev'g 30 T.C.M. 519 (1971), the Sixth and Ninth Circuit decisions cited
in notes 2 and 3 supra, involved the validity of the regulation prohibiting section 1235
treatment to transfers which are limited by field of use. The circuit courts in both cases
reversed the Tax Court and sustained the validity of the regulation.
12. 507 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1974).
13. 51 T.C. 927 (1969), acquiesced in result only 1973-2 CuM. BULL. 3.
14.

61 T.C. 332 (1973).
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By "rights to a patent" we think Congress was referring to the rights
to 'make, use and sell" the patented invention .... We think
section 1235 requires merely the transfer of "property" and that
the rights in such property to make, use, and sell the patented invention be conveyed to the transferee. We read therein no prohibition on the division of a patent into different fields of application
so long as all substantial rights
or into different geographical areas 15
to the patent so divided are granted.
,In reversing the Tax Court in Klein, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that
the plain meaning of the phrase "all substantial rights" precludes separating
the rights inherent in the patent geographically.' 6 By "substantial," the
court concluded that Congress meant that the retention of "minor" rights by
the transferor, such as a security interest, would not preclude capital gain
treatment. 17 The court found support for its conclusion that geographically
limited transfers are outside the intended purview of the statute in the Senate
Finance Committee report on the bill which became section 1235.18 Section
1235 applies to a transfer "of all substantial rights to a patent, or an
19
The
undivided interest therein which includes a part of all such rights."'
Seventh Circuit quoted the section of the Senate report defining the term
"undivided" interest:
By "undivided interest" a part of each property right represented
by the patent (constituting a fractional share of the whole patent)
is meant (and not, for example, a lesser interest such as a right
to income, or a license limited geographically, or a license which
conveys some, but not all, of the claims or uses covered by the

patent) .20

The Senate report, however, appears to be ambiguous in regard to
whether geographically limited transfers are within the contemplation of the
statute and seems, in fact, to support an interpretation contrary to that given
it by the Seventh Circuit. While the quoted language may be read, as the
Seventh Circuit read it, to imply that Congress intended to exclude licenses
15. 51 T.C. 927, 930 (1969) (citation omitted).
16. 507 F.2d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 1974).

17. Id. The court cited two cases, Allen v. Werner, 190 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1951),
and Allied Chemical Corp. v. United States, 370 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1967), both of which
applied the accepted rule that in determining whether a transfer constitutes a sale or a
license the form of the transaction does not govern, but instead actual circumstances will
be examined. In Allen v. Werner, supra, the Fifth Circuit held that the reservation by
the seller of a right to prevent unlimited reassignment by the assignor and a right to

terminate the assignment in the event that the assignor fails to perform his obligations
under the agreement do not evidence a license as opposed to an assignment. In Allied
Chemical Corp., supra, the Second Circuit held that the facts demonstrated that a license
was intended.

The facts showed, among other things, that the alleged assignment was

non-exclusive, that is, that the assignor did not obtain an exclusive right to use the
patented invention in any geographic location or in any industry. Id. at 699.
18. 507 F.2d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 1974).
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1256(a).
20. 507 F.2d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 1974), quoting S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1954), 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws at 5082.
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limited geographically, it may also be read to indicate merely that such
licenses do not constitute an "undivided interest" in a patent, without any
implication concerning whether or not they are contemplated within the
phrase "all substantial rights." It is revealing that at another point the
Senate report indicates that the phrase "all substantial rights" was intended
to pick up the existing case law concerning the requirements of a sale or
exchange and was not intended to alter the requirements as then recognized,
with one exception which will be discussed. The Senate report states:
The section does not detail precisely what constitutes the formal
components of a sale or exchange of patent rights beyond requiring
that all substantial rights evidenced by the patent (other than the
right to such periodic or contingent payments) should be transferred to the transferee for consideration. This requirement recognizes the basic criteriaof a "sale or exchange" under existing law,
with the exception noted relating to contingent payments, which exception1 is justified in the patent area for "holders" as herein de2
fined.
Because of the difficulty of valuing a patent before it is exploited,
patents are often sold on a royalty basis. The exception to which the Senate
report refers related to a controversy concerning whether amounts received
from the assignment of a patent were entitled to capital gain treatment if
the purchase price was conditioned on the use or productivity of the
invention. The Service frequently litigated this question and lost consistently. 22 In 1946 it acquiesced in the result of a Tax Court decision allowing
capital gain treatment. 23 in 1950, however, it reversed its position and in
Mimeograph 6490 announced that amounts payable over the remaining life
of a patent or measured by the production, sale, or use of the patent would
be taxable as ordinary income. 24 The Senate report states:
To obviate the uncertainty caused by this mimeograph and to
provide an incentive to inventors to contribute to the welfare of the
Nation, your committee intends, in subsection (a), to give statutory
assurance to certain patent holders that the sale of a patent
(whether as an "assignment" or "exclusive license") shall not be
deemed not to constitute a "sale or exchange" for tax purposes
solely on account of the mode of payment.25
Thus, the Senate report indicates that section 1235 was enacted to
legislatively overrule Mimeograph 6490 and the phrase "all substantial rights
21. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. (1954), supra note 20 (emphasis
supplied).
22. See, e.g., Kronner v. United States, 110

F.

Supp. 730 (Ct. Cl. 1954); Edward

C. Meyers, 6 T.C. 258 (1946); Commissioner v. Celanese Corp. 140 F.2d 339 (D.C.
Cir. 1944); Commissioner v. Hopkinson, 127 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1942).

23. 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 3, acquiescing in result of Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258
(1946).
24. 1950-1 Cum. BULL. 9; The Service also withdrew its acquiescence in Edward C.
Myers and substituted non-acquiescence. 1950-1 CuM. BULL. 7.
25. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. (1954), supra note 20.
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to a patent" was included to incorporate existing case law on the requirements for a sale or exchange. It remains only to be considered whether a
transfer of patent rights prior to 1954 which was limited geographically
26
would have qualified as a sale or exchange under pre-1954 Code law.
Vincent A. Marco2 7 was the first case expressly holding that such a
transfer constituted a sale or exchange under section 117 of the 1939 Code.
It was decided in 1955, after the enactment of section 1235, but it seems
reasonably clear that the same result would have applied under authority
existing before the enactment of the 1954 Code. For example, the leading
case setting forth the distinction between an assignment of a patent and a
license is the Supreme Court's decision in Waterman v. Mackenzie.2 8
Though not a tax case, Waterman v. MacKenzie was cited and quoted in
numerous tax cases before 1954 for the requirements of a sale or exchange.29 It held that for a transfer to constitute an assignment the
transferor must convey the three basic rights: the right to make, use, and sell
the patented invention. In addition, the decision expressly recognized that
such a transfer would constitute an assignment irrespective of whether it
transferred such rights for all or any specified part of the United States.
Thus, the Supreme Court said:
Whether a transfer of a particular right or interest under a patent
is an assignment or a license does not depend upon the name by
which it calls itself, but upon the legal effect of its provisions. For
instance, a grant of an exclusive right to make, use and vend two
patented machines within a certain district is an assignment, and
gives the grantee the right to sue in his own name for an infringement within the district, because the right, although limited to making, using and vending two machines, excludes all other persons,
even the patentee, from making, using or vending like machines
within the district. On the other hand, the grant of an exclusive right under the patent within a certain district, which does
not include the right to make, and the right to use, and the right
to sell, is not a grant of a title in the 30
whole patent-right within the
district, and is therefore only a license.
Again, in United States v. General Electric Co., 31 another decision frequently cited in pre-1954 (and post-1954) tax cases, the Supreme Court restated
the rule as follows:
26. The Tax Court in Vincent B. Rodgers, discussed in the text at note 13 supra,
concluded that such a transfer would have constituted a sale or exchange. 51 T.C. 927,

929 (1969).

The cases cited by the court, however, were decided after the enactment of

the 1954 Code, though under prior law. Id.
27. 25 T.C. 544 (1955).
28. 138 U.S. 252 (1891).
29. See, e.g., Broderick v. Neale, 201 F.2d 621, 623-24 (10th Cir. 1953); Cleveland
Graphite Bronze Co., 10 T.C. 974, 987-89 (1948); Kimble Glass Co., 9 T.C. 183, 18990 (1947); Edward C. Myers, 6 T.C. 258, 262-63 (1946), result acquiesced in 1946-1
CuM. BULL. 3,non. acq. 1950-1 CuM. BULL. 7.

30. 138 U.S. 252, 256 (1891) (citation omitted).
31. 272 U.S.476 (1926),
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The owner of a patent may assign it to another and convey (1)
the exclusive right to make, use and vend the invention throughout
the United States or (2) an undivided part or share of that exclusive right or (3) the exclusive right under the patent within and
through a specific part of the United States. But any assignment
or transfer short of one of these is a license giving the licensee no
title in the patent
and no right to sue at law in his own name for an
32
infringement.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Klein v. Commissioner33 appears to be incorrect. While the phrase "all substantial rights to a patent"
could reasonably be understood in common parlance to exclude from section
1235 transfers of geographically limited patent rights, the legislative history,
rather than supporting such a construction, indicates that the phrase was
intended to have a technical meaning. It was intended to adopt by
reference existing case law on the requirements of a sale or exchange, and
under existing law a transfer of the right to make, use, and sell the patented
invention apparently would have been treated as a sale or exchange for tax
purposes even though the transfer was limited to a specific geographic region
within the United States.
Inclusion in Gross Income of the Value of Unsolicited Merchandise
In an unusual case, Haverly v. United States,34 the Seventh Circuit
held that the value of unsolicited merchandise must be included in gross
income if the taxpayer donates the merchandise to a charity and takes a
charitable deduction for the gift. The taxpayer in Haverly was an elementary school principal. He regularly received unsolicited textbooks from publishers seeking consideration of the books for use in the school's curriculum.
During the tax year in question he donated the books to the school library
and took a charitable deduction.
The parties stipulated that the taxpayer's receipt of the textbooks did not
constitute a gift within the meaning of section 102 because the transfer "did
not proceed from a detached and disinterested generosity nor out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses."' 35 They also stipulated
that the taxpayer was entitled to a deduction under section 170 for the gift to
the school library. 36 The government contended, however, that the value of
the books constituted gross income under section 61. It argued that "once a
person 'manifests an intent . . . to accept such property' it is properly

32. Id. at 489 (emphasis supplied).
33. 507 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1974).
34. 513 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'g 374 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Ill. 1974), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 216 (1975).

35. 513 F.2d 224, 225 (7thCir. 1974).
36. Id.
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classified as taxable income" and "the claiming of the charitable de37
duction. . . evidences the requisite intent."
The district court rejected this contention. 38 The court distinguished
cases which have considered the definition of gross income under section
61,39 including the Supreme Court's landmark decisions in the Glenshaw
It noted that the receipt of unsolicited
Glass40 and Duberstein4 1 cases.
merchandise does not fit within the examples of gross income enumerated in
section 61, which it considered to be "instructive of the types of things that
are . . . considered [to be included in gross income]." Essentially, the
court reasoned "that income cannot be foisted upon an individual involuntarily."' 42 It rejected the government's contention that the taxpayer's taking of
the deduction indicated his "voluntary" acceptance of the unsolicited merchandise on the ground that the taking of the deduction does not differ from
the acceptance of such merchandise in other situations which are not deemed
to result in gross income. Thus the court said:
The problem is that such an intent [to accept the merchandise]
is equally as clearly evidenced when the housewife uses the detergent sample for the family wash, or when the book reviewer takes
the book for his own personal library, or when the store customer
swallows the new brand of cracker being promoted, or when the
school principal donates his sample text to the school library without claiming any deduction, or when a judge receives books from
a publisher and puts 43them on the shelves in his chambers for possible future reference.
In reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit expressly sidestepped
the hypothetical situations posed in the district court opinion. It emphasized
that the phrase "all income from whatever source derived" in section 61
reflects a Congressional intention "to use the full measure of its taxing
power" and "to tax all gains except those specifically exempted."' 44 The
court also referred to the Supreme Court's decision in the Glenshaw Glass
Co. case, 45 which it said "held that the language of Section 61(a) encompasses all 'accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion'.1 46 Thus, the court concluded as follows:
In view of the comprehensive conception of income embodied in
the statutory language and the Supreme Court's interpretation of
37.
38.

374 F. Supp. 1041, 1043 (N.D.fll. 1974).
374 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D.11l. 1974).

39. Id. at 1044.
40. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
41. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
42.

374 F. Supp. 1041, 1045 (N.D.IU. 1974).

43. Id. (emphasis by the court).
44. 513 F.2d 224, 226 (7th Cir. 1975), quoting James v. United States, 366 U.S.
213, 218-19 (1961).

45. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
46. 513 F.2d 224, 226 (7thCir. 1975).
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that language, we conclude that when the intent to exercise complete dominion over unsolicited samples is demonstrated by donating those samples to a charitable institution and taking a tax deduction therefor,
the value of the samples received constitutes gross in47
come.
Although the Seventh Circuit's decision in Haverly will undoubtedly
provoke discussion, the decision appears to be correct. The result is in
accordance with the broad scope of the definition of gross income consistently recognized by the Supreme Court. It is also consistent with the rule that
found money, or treasure trove, must be included in gross income. 48 That
the receipt and use of unsolicited merchandise in cases such as those
described in the district court's opinion is not treated as gross income under
section 61 probably results from considerations that do not apply with equal
force to the situation presented in Haverly. The value of such merchandise
is ordinarily minimal. And, the burden on the taxpayer in valuing and
reporting the receipt of such merchandise, and on the Internal Revenue
Service in administering the tax laws, would be excessive if all such items
were required to be included in gross income.
Liability of Third Parties for the 100 Percent Penalty for Failure to Pay
Over Withholding Taxes
In two cases decided during the past term, Adams v. United States49
and Haffa v. United States,50 the Seventh Circuit considered the question of
the liability of third parties for the 100 percent penalty imposed by section
667251 for failure to collect and pay over withholding taxes on employee
wages. The two decisions illustrate the penalty to which creditors and other
third parties are exposed when they become actively involved in the day-today financial affairs of distressed companies.
Section 6672 imposes a penalty upon "[a]ny person required to collect,
truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed [by the Internal
Revenue Code] who willfully fails to collect . . . or truthfully account for
and pay over such tax". 52 The penalty so imposed is equal to the total
amount of the tax not collected or paid over. Ordinarily, when withholding
taxes are not paid, the 100 percent penalty is imposed upon the company's
officers or employees who are responsible for the payment of its obligations. 53 However, it is well established that the penalty may be assessed
47. Id.
48. Cesarini v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 3 (N.D.Ohio 1969), affd, 428 F.2d 812
(6th Cir. 1970); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (1965); Rev. Rul. 61, 1953-1 CuM. BULL. 17.
49. 504 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'g 353 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
50. 516F.2d931 (7thCir. 1975).
51. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6672.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Bernardi v. United States, 507 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1974) (a Seventh
Circuit decision during the past term), af/'g 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9170 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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against persons who are not officers, directors, employees, or shareholders if
it is they who are actually responsible for the company's failure to withhold
54
or pay over the taxes due.
The issue in Adams v. United States55 was whether the district court
was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of a finance company
which had entered into a revolving loan arrangement with the defaulting
employer, the Skobis Company. The Service assessed the penalty against
both an officer of Skobis, William Adams, and against the finance company,
Lakeshore Commercial Finance Corporation.
Pursuant to the loan agreement, Lakeshore made 61 advances over a
six-month period to the Skobis Company, secured by the company's inventory and accounts receivable. Lakeshore collected the accounts receivable
and determined the amount of each advance depending upon the amount of
then available collateral. 56 The details of the arrangement are sketchy.
According to an affidavit filed in the district court in support of Lakeshore's
motion for summary judgment, the advances were generally made by check
payable to Skobis or by deposit directly into its bank account. In one
instance a check was made payable to one of Skobis' creditors, and in some
other instances checks were made payable jointly to Skobis and certain
taxing authorities. Lakeshore's affidavit asserted that it had no control over
the funds once they were transferred to Skobis.5 7 However, an affidavit
filed by Adams in opposition of the motion for summary judgment asserted
that Lakeshore did have "'final authority' over the application of the
earnings of Skobis" and that it exercised such authority on a day-to-day
basis. 58 The Adams affidavit also asserted that "Lakeshore, at one point,
actually determined to discontinue the payment of withholding taxes to the
government on behalf of Skobis". 5 9
The district court granted Lakeshore's motion for summary judgment,
holding that the affidavits disclosed no issue of material fact and that
Lakeshore was not a "person" obligated to collect or pay over withholding
taxes within the meaning of section 6672.0 In the latter regard, the district
court relied on United States v. Hill,6 a Fifth Circuit decision which implies
that the 100 percent penalty may be assessed against a creditor only if it
manages the internal affairs of the defaulting corporation, even if the
54. See, e.g., Regan & Co. v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 470 (E.D.N.Y. 1968);
Pacific Nat'l Ins. v. United States, 422 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
937 (1970); Melillo v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 323 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
55. 504 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1974).

56. Id. at 74.
57. Id. at 75.
58. Id. at 76.
59. Id.
60. 353 F. Supp. 333, 335 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
61. 368 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1966).
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creditor is able to, and does, prevent
the defaulting company from paying
62
withholding taxes to the government.
The Seventh Circuit reversed. With respect to the district court's
reliance on Hill, the court noted a possible factual distinction relating to the
degree of the lender's control over its debtor's financial affairs. 63 More
significantly, however, it observed "that the more recent trend seems to favor
an expanding view of 'persons' liable or responsible for the nonpayment of
withholding taxes."' 64 The court noted that summary judgment has been
held to be inappropriate where the issue is "whether a lending institution has
assumed such control over its debtor's business as to become a liable 'person'
and whether the particular institution has acted willfully in preferring other
creditors over the government within the meaning of §6672, since such
questions present material and substantial issues of fact."'65 In view of the
conflicting affidavits of Adams and Lakeshore, the court concluded that
summary judgment was improper and remanded the case for trial. 66
Haffa v. United States,67 the second case decided by the Seventh
62. In Hill the evidence showed that pursuant to a loan agreement which the
defendant bank made with a financially distressed customer, the bank's approval was
required for a time on all checks over $500 written by the corporation. Since the
corporation had no balance in its checking account, all such checks were, in effect, loans
from the bank. In exercising its power to approve checks, the bank refused to honor
some checks, allowing payment only of those bills which it determined to be essential to
the company's continued operations, and it expressly refused to authorize checks to the
government in payment of withholding taxes. 368 F.2d at 620, 623. In affirming the
setting aside of a jury verdict against the bank, the Fifth Circuit concluded in Hill as
follows:
That the Bank allowed the company to retain and use some of the funds belonging to it cannot be transposed into an assumption of tax liability by the
Bank. . . . That the Bank exercised a veto power over corporate checks,
funded by this method to insure their use to keep the company alive nowhere
brings the Bank within the penal provisions of the statute.
Id. at 623.
63. 504 F.2d 73, 76-77 (7th Cir. 1974).
64. Id. at 76. The court cited Pacific National Insurance Co. v. United States, 422
F.2d 26 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 'U.S. 937 (1970). The defendant in that case was
an insurance company which had written performance bonds for a company which
became unable to meet its obligations in connection with certain government contracts.
The evidence showed that the insurance company paid the employees' wages and other
operating expenses as they came due but expressly refused to advance the additional
amounts needed to pay the withholding taxes. In holding the insurance company liable
for the penalty, the Ninth Circuit observed that "the language of [section 6672] is broad
enough to reach an entity which assumes the function of determining whether or not an
employer will pay over taxes withheld from its employees." 422 F.2d at 30.
65. 504 F.2d 73, 77 (7th Cir. 1974).
66. Id. Judge Campbell (Senior District Judge of the Northern District of Illinois
sitting by designation) dissented. In his view, the affidavits disclosed that Lakeshore
controlled the disposition of the Skobis Company's "earnings and income" only in the
sense that under the revolving loan agreement its "earnings and income" constituted
liquidated collateral, and, hence, the basis for future loans. Because he perceived no
genuine issue concerning Lakeshore's control over the expenditure of the funds which it
loaned to Skobis, he believed summary judgment was proper. 504 F.2d 73, 77-80 (7th
Cir. 1974).
67. 516 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975).
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Circuit during the past term on the question of the liability of third parties
for the 100 percent penalty, involved a more novel factual situation. The
company whose failure to pay the withholding taxes caused the controversy
was G.T.O. Steel Erectors, a firm which had been hired to do construction
work in connection with the renovation of certain facilities at the Aurora
Downs racetrack. The issue in the case concerned the liability for the
penalty of Thomas Cooper, an employee and financial adviser to the
partnership which owned the track.
The facts are as follows. During the course of construction, the bank
with which G.T.O. maintained its checking account contacted the racetrack
indicating that G.T.O. was frequently overdrawing its account. The bank
stated that it would close the account unless Cooper, with whom the bank
was familiar, co-signed all future G.T.O. checks in order to assure the bank
that sufficient funds were on deposit. Cooper was directed by his employer
to do so and for a period thereafter spent a small amount of time each week
at G.T.O.'s offices, signing checks and verifying that expenditures claimed by
G.T.O. in connection with its construction work at the racetrack were
actually being made. 68 The opinion indicates that Cooper did not supervise
the accounting and bookkeeping of G.T.O., other than in relation to the one
checking account, and that he "never exercised any control over preferences
69
of one creditor to another".
Early in 1967, however, after Cooper's co-signing authority had ended,
certain creditors of G.T.O. contacted Aurora Downs and indicated that
70
amounts owed them by the construction company were not being paid.
The opinion indicates that Cooper paid these creditors on behalf of the
partnership believing that, if not paid, the creditors would be entitled to
mechanic's liens against the racetrack property, and that such liens "would
constitute a breach of the partnership's mortgage on the property and
7
grounds for revocation of [its] racing license as well". '
Based upon all of these actions, the Service contended that Cooper was
responsible for G.T.O.'s failure to pay withholding taxes on the wages paid
to its employees. However, the district court held that the government had
failed to prove that Cooper was a person "'required' to collect or pay over
68. Id. at 933-34.
69. Id. at 934. In this regard, it is also noteworthy that in paying G.T.O. on
behalf of the racetrack, the amounts Cooper paid reflected gross wages. Thus, the court
concluded "that G.T.O. always had an available source of revenue specifically intended
for the withholding fund." ld. at 937. The opinion also states that when Cooper was
informed by one of the principals of G.T.O. that the company was not going to file a tax
return covering withholding taxes because its accountant had died, he stressed the
importance of filing the return and paying the tax if funds were available, and "was led
to believe that another bookkeeper was retained to remedy the problem." Id. at 934.
70. Id.
71. Id.

TAXATION

taxes for [G.T.O]."'7 2 The government appealed, contending among other
things, that, as a factual matter, Cooper had sufficient control over G.T.O.'s
financial affairs to make him responsible for the payment of its withholding
73
taxes.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In its opinion, the court referred to its
earlier decision in Adams v. United States, 74 which, it stated, "held that the
critical question was whether the [party upon whom the government sought
to impose the penalty] had assumed significant control of the disbursal of
funds by the debtor corporation. '' 75 The court concluded that the facts
showed that Cooper did not have sufficient control over G.T.O.'s finances to
be liable for the penalty. 76 It noted that Cooper's connection with G.T.O.
was for the limited purpose of preventing further overdrafts on G.T.O.'s
checking account and verifying that certain claimed expenditures were
actually made, and also concluded that the payment of certain of G.T.O.'s
creditors on behalf of the partnership in order to avoid possible mechanics'
liens was irrelevant to the question of whether Cooper was liable for
77
payment of G.T.O.'s withholding taxes.
ESTATE TAX

Special 10-Year Estate Tax Lien Not Extended by the Filing of an Action
In United States v. Cleavenger,78 the Seventh Circuit held that the
special estate tax lien provided by section 6324(a)(1) expires ten years
from the date of the decedent's death and is not extended by the filing of an
action to recover the tax within the ten-year period.
Two types of tax liens are available for the enforcement of the estate
tax. The first is the general tax lien under section 6321, which provides as
follows:
[I]f any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay
the same after demand, the amount . . .shall be a lien in favor
of the United States upon all property and rights
to property,
whether real or personal, belonging to such person. 79
72. Id. at 935. The district court's opinion is unpublished but is reproduced in the
Seventh Circuit opinion.
73. The government also contended that the district court had based its decision on
the erroneous premises that only officers and employees of the debtor company could be
liable for the penalty. Id. The Seventh Circuit found no such premise in the district
court's opinion.
74. 504 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1974), discussed supra at note 55 and accompanying

text.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

516 F.2d 931, 936 (7th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 936-37.
Id.
517 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1975), affg 325 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Ind. 1971).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6321.
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Section 6322 provides that the general tax lien arises at the time the tax is
assessed and continues "until the liability for the amount assessed (or a
judgment against the taxpayer arising out of such liability) is satisfied or
becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time". 80
The second type of lien available for the enforcement of the estate tax
is the special estate tax lien provided by section 6324. It arises on the date
of the decedent's death and attaches to all property which is includable in
the gross estate. Specifically, the statute provides as follows:
Unless the estate tax imposed by Chapter 11 is sooner paid in full,
or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time, it shall be
a lien upon the gross estate of the decedent for 10 years from the
date of death ....
81
The section also provides that the lien is divested from property which is
used to pay charges against the estate and administration expenses which are
82
allowed by court order.
In Cleavenger the government sought to enforce the special lien against
property in which the decedent had been a joint tenant, and which,
therefore, passed by operation of law to the other joint tenant upon her
death. The decedent died on July 14, 1958. Although a federal estate tax
return was filed, the tax was never paid, and in 1964 the state probate court
83
entered judgment against the estate for the taxes which had been assessed.
In 1965, the government filed suit in the federal district court to foreclose
the tax liens. In June of 1970, five years later, the government moved for
summary judgment against all parties.8 4 With respect to the property at
issue before the Seventh Circuit, the district court held that the lien expired
on July 14, 1968, ten years after the date of the decedent's death. 85 In
rejecting the government's argument that the ten-year period mentioned in
section 6324(a) is merely a period of limitation, which therefore would be
extended by the filing of the government's suit, the district court held that the
plain meaning of the statute was that ten years was the duration of the lien,
rather than the period during which the government could commence an
action. The court noted that it is unlikely that the ten-year period in section
6324 was intended as a period of limitation since the section expressly makes
applicable the general periods of limitation provided by sections 6501 and
6502.86
80. Id. § 6322.
81. Id. § 6324(a).
82. Id.
83 517 F.2d 230, 231 (7th Cir. 1975).

84. Neither the district court nor the Seventh Circuit decision indicates why the
case remained dormant for so long. The district court decision indicates only that
certain procedural matters were resolved in late 1969 and in 1970. 325 F. Supp. 871,
873 (N.D. Ind. 1971).
85. 325 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Ind. 1971). Liens against other property were also
involved in the district court proceedings.

86. Id. at 871-76.

Sections 6501 and 6502 contain the general limitation periods
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The Seventh Circuit affirmed. 8 7 It noted that although there are five
federal cases in which the special estate tax lien has been foreclosed more
than ten years after the date of the decedent's death, no issue was raised in
any of these cases concerning the expiration of the lien. 88 Thus, the case
was one of first impression in the federal courts. The court agreed with the
district court's reasoning that the plain meaning of the statutory language
indicates that the ten-year period was intended to denote the duration of the
line. The opinion indicates that, in reaching its decision, the Seventh Circuit
was concerned with the impact of the. special estate tax lien on the
transferability of assets held by a decedent at the time of his death. A cloud
on the title to such property results from the fact that the special estate tax
lien attaches as of the decedent's death and, unlike the general tax lien, the
special estate tax lien requires no filing. The court said:
Under the Government's position, there would be no assurance
whatsoever from the passage of time. Suit could be filed for foreclosure within the ninth year after the decedent's death and if the
proceedings took the normal leisurely course which tax litigation
reaching this court seems sometimes to have as an attribute, the
foreclosure, and the life of the now latent lien, could be extended
well into the next decade. We have been furnished no persuasive
reason for determining that the Government does not have available more than adequately effective means of estate tax collection
by utilization of assessment line procedures buttressed by the freezing act of the special tax lien, assuming, of course, that the business
of collecting the tax is followed with any type of vigor whatsoever. 89
Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the special estate tax lien expires
10 years from the date of the decedent's death and is not extended by the
government's filing of an action to collect the tax within the 10-year period.
CRIMINAL TAX PROCEDURE

Dickerson Rule on Miranda Warnings Reaffirmed
In United States v. Oliver,"° the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed the rule it
announced in 1969 in United States v. Dickerson,"' that Miranda9 2 warn-

applicable to the assessment and collection of taxes imposed by the Internal Revenue
Code.
87. 517 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1975).
88. Id. at 233; Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943); United States
v. Cruikshank, 48 F.2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Rosenberg v. McLaughlin, 66 F.2d 271
(9th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 696 (1933); United States v. Cury, 61-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 12,003 (W.D. Va. 1961); United States v. Novack, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
13,013
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Kaufman v. Herter, 194 N.Y.S.2d 848, 851, 24 Misc. 2d 187
(Sup. Ct. 1959) (a state court decision which expressly deals with the issue and
concludes that the lien expires 10 years from the date of the decedent's death.
89. 517 F.2d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 1975).
90. 505 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1974).

91. 413 F.2d 1111 (7thCir. 1969).
92. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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ings must be given to a taxpayer who is under criminal investigation "at the
inception of the first contact . . . after the case has been transferred to the
Intelligence Division" and that the exclusionary rule of Miranda will apply to
any evidence obtained from the taxpayer if the required warning is not
given. 93
The taxpayer in Oliver was convicted of failing to report substantial

earnings, apparently resulting from sales of narcotics. Certain information
concerning the defendant's net worth was crucial to his conviction. This
information was obtained from him during an interview with two special
agents at the office of the Intelligence Division. 9 4 Although the agents read
a Miranda-like warning to the defendant at the beginning of the interview,
the warning failed to advise him of his right to remain silent and contained

an ambiguity concerning his right to have counsel present during the
interview.9 5
The government did not contend that the warning which was given was
adequate if Miranda applied. 96

Instead it argued that Miranda was inappli-

icable, since the defendant was not in custody, 9 7 and that the Seventh
Circuit should reexamine the Dickerson rule in light of its more recent
98
decision in United States v. Sicilia.

The court, however, while noting that the Dickerson rule has not been
followed in other circuits, 99 distinguished Sicilia'0 0 and reaffirmed Dicker-

son, holding that taking the defendant into custody is not the crucial point in
the case of an Internal Revenue Service investigation.

Essentially, the court

reasoned that in the usual non-tax criminal case the warnings must be given
93. 413 F.2d 1111, 1117 (7th Cir. 1969).
94. The decision notes that the interview occurred after the special agents, having
learned that the defendant would be in the Federal Building, located him "in the vicinity
of the grand jury room." 505 F.2d at 303. This was apparently their first interview
with the taxpayer, though the investigation was begun by the Intelligence Division
several months earlier. The opinion also notes that though the taxpayer was technically
free to go at any time during the meeting, the special agents intercepted and refused to
transmit to the taxpayer a message purportedly from his attorney. Accordingly, the
court characterized the situation "for the purpose of applying the Miranda test . . . as
one in which [the] defendant's liberty was significantly restrained." 505 F.2d at 306. It
does not appear, however, that that fact is material to the holding of the case since the
Dickerson rule applies irrespective of the degree of restraint.
95. 505 F.2d at 304. The warning which was given is the warning which IRS
News Release IR-949 (Nov. 26, 1968) states is required to be given by the agents at such
meeting.
96. Id.
97. ld.
98. 475 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1973).
99. 505 F.2d at 304 n.9 and associated text. See note 105 infra.
100. The court noted that in Scilia it refused to extend Dickerson to require F.B.I.
agents to give a Miranda warning when they were merely seeking permission to search
the premises of the defendant's company for a stolen fork lift which a tip indicated might
be present. The court noted that unlike the situation in a tax investigation, there was no
ambiguity in the role of the F.B.I. agents. Moreover, the defendant was not a real
suspect until after the stolen fork lift was discovered. 505 F.2d at 306.
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when the defendant is taken into custody because "[ilt is at [that] point
that our adversary system of criminal proceedings commences."''1 1 The
02
court stressed the "dual criminal-civil nature of an I.R.S. interrogation."
The Internal Revenue Service commences the preparation of its criminal
case when it assigns the case to the Intelligence Division. When the
taxpayer is interrogated by the special agents after that point without a clear
explanation of their mission, "three key misapprehensions for the taxpayer"
are created, namely "the nature of the inquiry, his obligation to respond, and
the possible consequences of doing So. ' '10 3 The court concluded that:
[T]he practical effect of these misapprehensions during questioning of a taxpayer was to compel him to provide information that
could be used to obtain his conviction in a criminal tax fraud proceeding, in much the same way that placing a suspect under physical restraint leads to psychological compulsion. Thus, the misapprehensions are tantamount to the deprivation of the suspect's freein any significant way, repeatedly referred to in
dom of action
Miranda.'04
It should be noted that the Seventh Circuit is alone among the circuits
in requiring Miranda warnings when a tax investigation is transferred to the
Intelligence Division. All other circuits have considered the issue and have
held that "the test is whether the suspect 'has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way.' "105 While there is
language in the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Oliver to the effect that the
court characterized the interrogation involved there as constituting a signficant deprivation of the defendant's liberty, it is clear that such a finding was
not material to the result since the Dickerson rule requires that Miranda
warnings be given at the first interview with the taxpayer after the case is
transferred to the Intelligence Division, irrespective of the circumstances of
that meeting.' 0 6
CONCLUSION

Of the twenty-six cases involving federal tax controversies decided by
the Seventh Circuit during the past term, none is likely to become a
101. 505 F.2d at 305 n.12, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).
102. 505 F.2d at 305.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. United States v. Beckwith, 510 F.2d 741, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1975), quoting
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966). See also Taglianetti v. United States, 398
F.2d 558 (1st Cir. 1969); United States v. White, 417 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1969); United
States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Bagdasian, 398 F.2d
971 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Maius, 378 F.2d 716 (6th Cir. 1967); Muse v. United States, 405 F.2d 40 (8th
Cir. 1968); United States v. Chikata, 427 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1970); Hensley v. United
States, 406 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1969); 10 MERTONS, LAW OF FEDERAL TAXATON at 55 &
nn.13.28-13.37 (Cum. Supp. 1975); and 10 MERTONS, supra, at 6 (Supp. July 1975.).

106. 505 F.2d 301, 305-06 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d

1111, 1117 (7thCir. 1969).
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landmark in federal tax law. As one would expect, most of the cases
applied established principles to ordinary factual circumstances. Of the few
cases where the law was unsettled, Klein v. Commissioner,10 7 the patent
case, and United States v. Cleavenger,10 8 the estate tax lien case, stand out.
In Klein, the rationale advanced by the court, namely its reference to
legislative history, does not appear to support the result which the court
reached. The result in Cleavenger, however, a case of first impression,
appears to be fully justified by the inferences which the court drew from the
statute and by the policy which the court sought to further.
107.

507 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1974), discussed supra in the text at notes 1 through

108.

517 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1975), discussed supra in the text at notes 78 through

33.
89.
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